We analyze conditions under which there exists an e¢ cient, Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), individually rational (IR), budget-balanced (BB) mechanism, when the mechanism designer has commitment power. We consider IR constraints where agents have the option to (permanently) exit the mechanism in each period. This captures situations where there are restrictions on the nature of long-term contracts agents can sign, such as at-will employment contracts, as well as restrictions on posting bonds. In addition, the tools of mechanism design are often used to model decentralized games, and period-by-period IR constraints may correspond to the need to deter certain types of deviations in a dynamic game. BB is a desirable property when there is no individual without private information who can serve as a source or sink of funds; we may also be interested in e¢ ciency for a particular group of agents (e.g. colluding …rms), so that "burning money"violates e¢ ciency within the group.
We analyze conditions under which there exists an e¢ cient, Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), individually rational (IR), budget-balanced (BB) mechanism, when the mechanism designer has commitment power. We consider IR constraints where agents have the option to (permanently) exit the mechanism in each period. This captures situations where there are restrictions on the nature of long-term contracts agents can sign, such as at-will employment contracts, as well as restrictions on posting bonds. In addition, the tools of mechanism design are often used to model decentralized games, and period-by-period IR constraints may correspond to the need to deter certain types of deviations in a dynamic game. BB is a desirable property when there is no individual without private information who can serve as a source or sink of funds; we may also be interested in e¢ ciency for a particular group of agents (e.g. colluding …rms), so that "burning money"violates e¢ ciency within the group.
In a static setting, Claude d 'Aspremont and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet (1979) (AGV) constructed an e¢ cient, BIC, BB mechanism, in which given prior beliefs, each player receives the expected value (over opponent types) of opponent utilities. However, in a dynamic model, today's reports and allocations in ‡uence opponent prior beliefs in future periods, and so incentives for truthtelling are undermined.
In a general dynamic model, Susan Athey and Ilya Segal (2006) (AS) construct an e¢ cient mechanism satisfying BIC and BB, and they provide su¢ cient conditions for IR to hold when players are very patient and players'current reports have a vanishing impact on expected utility in the distant future. Here, we apply their construction to the bilateral trading game, interpreting the transfers and examining comparative statics. We also analyze IR constraints, …nding su¢ cient conditions for IR constraints to hold for moderate patience or when there is a non-trivial long-run impact of player's reports in a given period.
I. The Model
Time is indexed by t = 1; ::; 1: There are two players, the "buyer"(b) and the "seller"(s).
Each player i 2 fb; sg has a privately observed valuation for consuming a single indivisible object in each period (his "type" in period t), denoted i;t 2 i;t ; where i;t R + is …nite, and we let t = b;t s;t . We consider several alternative models of the stochastic process over player types, denoted (~ t ) 1 t=1 , as detailed below. The allocation is denoted (x b;t ; x s;t ) 2 f(0; 1); (1; 0)g. Payo¤s are x i;t i;t + y i;t , where y i;t 2 R is the transfer to player i in period t:
For a sequence ( t ) 1 t=1 ; we use the notation t = ( 1 ; ::; t ) and = ( t )
We assume the existence of a mechanism designer who receives reports from the players in each period (which are publicly observed by both players), and can commit in advance to a history-contingent allocation and transfer plan. The allocation to player i in period t is denoted ( b;t ; s;t ) : t ! f(0; 1); (1; 0)g; while the transfers, restricted to satisfy budget balance, are b;t : t ! R and s;t = b;t . The strategy of each player i speci…es player i's reports in all periods t as functions of the history of his true types and all reports. We say that the strategy is truthtelling if the player reports his true type for all histories.
We consider "ex post"IR constraints within each period: a player can exit after reports are made but before allocations and transfers are made. For patient players, interim and ex post IR constraints are similar, so we focus on the more stringent constraint. Once either player exits, the seller always keeps the object. We require that ex post IR constraints hold for all possible histories of true types and reports, in order to deter deviations where a player engages in a series of misreports and plans to exit for some realizations of future types.
II. Serially Correlated Valuations
Suppose that buyer and seller types are serially correlated, but that they are independent across players and the evolution of types is exogenous to the history of allocations. This captures the idea that a …rm's production technology and capabilities evolve slowly over time.
The types follow a …rst-order Markov process (so that today's type distribution depends only on yesterday's type), and to simplify exposition we assume that the types are a¢ liated over time. The e¢ cient policy allocates to the highest value player and so can be written We show that there exists a truthtelling BNE. Consider BIC for the buyer. Because we impose BB, the buyer must not wish to misreport in order to manipulate the seller's future incentive payments; however, the seller's future incentive payments depend on the seller's beliefs about the buyer, which are in turn functions of today's reports.
First, we show that from the buyer's perspective, the incentive payments for the seller in each future period t, s; ; have zero expectation no matter what reporting strategy the buyer uses, provided that the seller uses a truthful strategy. This follows because the seller's incentive payments give the seller the change in expected buyer utility due to the seller's current period report, but the buyer's expectation of this change is always zero. Formally, for every t and history of reports^ t 1 ;
For each t and s;t 1 ; let ẽ s;t ;~ s;t 1 be equal in distribution to ~ s;t ;~ s;t 1 : Equation (1) holds because for each t; the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE) implies
Since this holds for all possible histories, it must hold when we take expectations given the buyer's period t beliefs, even if the buyer does not follow a truthful reporting strategy.
Second, we show that in any period t 0 , the expected value of P 1 =t 0 t 0 b; provides the correct incentives for the buyer. By the one-stage deviation principle, it su¢ ces to verify that for any history of reports^ t 0 1 and true types for the buyer t 0 b ; the buyer has the incentive to report truthfully in period t 0 when he anticipates truthful reporting in future periods.
Note that^ b;t 0 only enters the …rst term of b;t 0 and the second term of b;t 0 +1 . We proceed by establishing that the …rst term of b;t 0 plus the buyer's expectation of the second term of
Critically, the second term of b;t 0 +1 ~ b;t 0 +1 ; ^ b;t 0 ;~ s;t 0 does not depend on~ b;t 0 +1 ; so that the buyer's expectation of it conditional on ( b;t 0 ;^ s;t 0 1 ) does not depend on b;t 0 and can be written as
using LIE. Adding (3) to the …rst term of b;t 0 ^ b;t 0 ;^ s;t 0 1 , yields (2). Since (2) represents the expected externality of the buyer's report on the seller, we conclude that the anticipation of future transfers induces the buyer to report truthfully. The function ' is the component of period t's transfer that corresponds to period t payo¤s, and ' and ' are the smallest and largest possible values of these. Let i = max t max i;t , and i = min t min i;t :
Proposition 1 Suppose seller valuations are serially independent. A su¢ cient condition for IR to hold in each period is:
The left-hand side of (4) is the sum of the worst-case buyer utility from consumption and the worst case of the di¤erence between the seller utility from consumption and his outside option. The right-hand side is the sum of worst-case transfers.
When both players'types are fully persistent, we essentially have a static model, in which, by the logic of the theorem of Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite (1983) , we know that IRs in general cannot be satis…ed (they require continuous types, but the result holds for many cases of discrete types as well).
With limited persistence, IRs are easier to satisfy. AS show that so long as the type process has a unique ergodic set (and thus a unique invariant distribution), IR constraints are satis…ed in this model for close enough to 1. Consider two examples with moderate patience. First, suppose that there are two possible "states"at the start of period t, z t = 0 and z t = 1, and a constant c; such thatz t = 1f~ t 1 > cg. Let p z =Pr t 1 (z t = 0jz) and (1 + p 0 p 1 ) (p 0 p 1 ) ( s;s;0 s;s;1 ) + s + ' ' (1 (p 0 p 1 )) :
Notice that so long as the impact of states on distributions is small enough and p 0 p 1 is small enough, the term in parentheses on the left-hand side is positive, and thus the left-hand side grows without bound as approaches 1; while the right-hand side remains bounded.
For particular parameter values, we can …nd a critical discount factor such that (5) holds.
In a second example, suppose t [0; 1] 2 for all t. Suppose there exist (4) is negative, while the right-hand side is positive. The inequality will be impossible to satisfy.
We emphasize that (4) is su¢ cient but not necessary. In a model of repeated trade with serially independent types, Susan Athey and David Miller (2006) show how reallocating transfers between states where IR constraints are binding and those where IR constraints do not bind, while preserving the expected transfers for each player, can reduce the critical discount factor required for sustaining e¢ cient trade. We conjecture that the qualitative conclusions about when (4) can be satis…ed will also apply to the question of whether IR constraints can be satis…ed with any transfers.
III. Learning by Doing
Consider the following model of learning by doing. There is a …nite set of possible states, Z R; with highest and lowest elements Z and Z. These states represent the stock of learning: in each period t, "nature"selects period t types using a probability distribution that depends on the state but not directly on time, and player types are independent conditional on the state z t : The states evolve according to z t = (z t 1 ; x b;t ). (To simplify exposition we restrict attention to deterministic transitions). We assume that higher states imply weakly higher (by First Order Stochastic Dominance) valuations for the buyer and weakly lower valuations for the seller, and that is weakly monotone in z t 1 : This is a Markov decision problem, and there exists a e¢ cient policy of the Markov form ( b ; s ) : t Z ! f(0; 1); (1; 0)g; which in turn induces a Markov process over states. It is well known that there exists a "Blackwell"policy, B , that is optimal for all su¢ ciently high.
In general, the e¢ cient policy may be biased away from the static e¢ cient allocation depending on the current state. In the special case where z t = x t 1 , the e¢ cient policy is stationary, since history is irrelevant after types are realized in period t. If, in addition, the two players are ex ante symmetric and learning by doing is also symmetric, the e¢ cient policy is just the static e¢ cient policy.
Fix ; with e¢ cient policy ( b ; s ). Let (z ;~ )jz t = z t be the random vector equal to the state and the type in period when the state in t is z t and when the e¢ cient policy is used from t to 1. 
The incentive payment i;t incorporate the change, starting from state z t ; to the expectation of player i's discounted payo¤s that results from player i's period-t report. The results of AS imply that with these transfers, truthtelling is a BNE. The arguments are similar to those in the last section, appropriately modi…ed to account for the fact that di¤erent reporting strategies lead to di¤erent distributions over future states. Now consider IR. Each player's incentive payment is large and positive (negative) when the player's type is lower (higher) than expected, and when period t's allocation can have (through its e¤ect on z t+1 ) a large impact on expected future utility for the opponent. AS
show that the following is su¢ cient for IR constraints to hold for su¢ ciently close to 1:
Condition M For the Blackwell policy B , the induced Markov process over states has a unique ergodic set (with a possibily empty set of transient states).
There will be a unique ergodic distribution if, for example, ( ) can be either zero or one with positive probability for all histories, and if is strictly increasing in 
The expressions ' and ' are analogous to those in the serially correlated valuations model, while i (z t ; x b;t ) contains all terms in a player's expected utility that depend on patience, representing the di¤erence between expected discounted future payo¤s and the portion of transfers corresponding to future periods in state z t . The following result provides su¢ cient conditions for there to exist a K such that the worst-case buyer expected utility is greater than K and the worst-case seller utility is greater than K:
Proposition 2 A su¢ cient condition for IR to hold in each period is min zt;x b;t s (z t ; x b;t ) + min
When will (6) be satis…ed? Condition (M) implies that from every initial state, convergence to the ergodic distribution occurs at a geometric rate. For any two states z t ; z However, when Condition (M) fails, (6) may not hold. Suppose that there are two ergodic sets of states. For example, suppose that under the Blackwell policy there is "increasing dominance": once one player gets su¢ ciently far ahead, it is e¢ cient to continue to allocate to that player often enough to keep him far ahead. Let z t be a critical state where (z t ; 0) is in the low ergodic set; while there is positive probability of entering the high ergodic set from (z t ; 1): Then the last two terms in b (z t ; x b;t ) grow without bound in . In an extreme case where the seller's (respectively buyer's) valuations are always above the buyer's (respectively seller's) in the low (resp. high) ergodic set, the …rst term in b (z t ; x b;t ) is zero, while the negative terms increase with . (Recall, however, that (6) is su¢ cient but not necessary.)
On the other hand, if the states have only a small impact on the distribution over valuations, then even if we have absorbing states, the su¢ cient conditions can still be satis…ed.
For example, suppose that ( Z; 0) = Z and (Z; 1) = Z; and that players are ex ante symmetric, so that starting from a "middle"state z 0 ; with the Blackwell policy, B b; (~ ; z 0 ) has support f0; 1g; so that both absorbing states are possible. Even so, i (z t ; x b;t ) grows without bound in so long as for each i, the e¤ect of the states is su¢ ciently small.
IV. Conclusions
Dynamic mechanisms contend with more stringent incentive compatibility constraints, since players can react to information that they learn in the course of the game. E¢ cient, BB, BIC mechanisms can be constructed by compensating players for the change in expected opponent utilities due to the report of today's information. We show that IR can be satis…ed when the long-run impact of today's information is always small relative to the worst-case player utilities, since the presence of future surplus that is unrelated to today's reports induces players to make large transfers and continue with the mechanism. The condition given in the proposition is su¢ cient for this. The expression given in the proposition relies on …nding a K such that this expression exceeds the outside options in the worst-case scenarios.
